




The Honorable David S. Tatel† 
This special issue reviews the breathtaking scope of Judge Stephen 
Williams’s work and his profound impact on administrative law. Steve was 
an extraordinary jurist and a wonderful man. As his colleague and friend, 
I take great pleasure in sharing some reflections on his life’s work. 
In his thirty-four years on the D.C. Circuit, Steve became one of the 
nation’s most admired judges. Everyone knew him for his warm 
collegiality; his precise, gentle questioning at oral argument; his analytical 
comments at conference; his wise, graceful, witty, and almost always 
persuasive opinions; and his fierce commitment to the rule of law. 
Two cases reveal much about this outstanding judge. The first is 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Shortly after 
our court decided to hear the case en banc, Steve dropped by my chambers 
and made a novel suggestion—that we prepare for oral argument together. 
We divided the case into eight key issues and throughout the next month 
or so exchanged memos and met together with our law clerks. Steve had a 
deep understanding of antitrust law, and I learned an enormous amount 
from him. But not until years later during lunch at the Capitol Grille did 
Steve reveal exactly why he had suggested that we prepare together. He 
explained that in this important case, the first to apply the antitrust laws to 
the personal computer, the nation would be best served if the court spoke 
with one voice, which he believed would be more likely if he, a 
conservative (his word), and I, a liberal (also his word), could agree. And 
that is exactly what happened. Under the leadership of Chief Judge Harry 
Edwards, who assigned a portion of the opinion to each member of the en 
banc court, the D.C. Circuit produced a unanimous 125-page opinion. 
The second case, Shelby County v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), rev’d, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), presented a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a key provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Steve 
and I again exchanged many memos and met often to discuss the 
constitutional and statutory issues. Unlike in Microsoft, however, 
agreement eluded us. I mention our conversations not because they were 
so interesting (they were) or because they significantly narrowed our areas 
of disagreement (they did), but because of the email from Steve that 
launched our discussions: “I’ve read the briefs, and I realize the Supreme 
Court has hinted where it’s headed”—he was referring to the Court’s 
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decision three years earlier in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District 
Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)—“but I remain uncertain. 
What’s your view, David?” 
Although both cases involved hot-button issues likely to divide most 
courts ideologically, Steve approached them without preconception, 
allowing his conclusions to emerge from his own study of the record and 
the law. Steve craved the intellectual satisfaction that comes from 
thoroughly exploring complex issues. And to this end, he was sincerely 
interested in his colleagues’ views—mine in these two cases, and many 
colleagues’ throughout his decades on the court. To Steve, collegiality 
meant far more than socializing, although he was very good at that. It 
meant listening to another’s perspective, sincerely considering it, 
responding on the merits, and sometimes even changing his mind. Steve 
truly loved engaging his colleagues, not just for the intellectual thrill, but 
to produce consensus or, failing that, narrower and more principled 
disagreements. Once Steve even lamented that we couldn’t publish, along 
with his opinion and my dissent, the many memos we had exchanged 
throughout the drafting process in order to show the public, as he put it, 
“how judges seek consensus.” 
Steve especially relished FERC cases. He heard over 250, resulting in 
170 reported opinions, over half of which he wrote himself. This former 
law professor converted each case into a fascinating seminar on economics, 
regulation, and administrative law. Had we received academic credit for 
sitting with Professor Williams, we would all have master’s degrees. 
Despite Steve’s affinity for dense technical issues, his opinions are 
lively and engaging, often sparkling with references to Greek history and 
mythology. Ulysses ties himself to the mast in an antitrust case, hapless 
youth enter the Minoan labyrinth that is the Clean Air Act, Pericles of 
Athens weighs in on the constitutionality of barring the press from Dover 
Air Force Base, and the ever-patient Penelope ravels and unravels her 
shroud in both an FCC case and a FERC opinion. Steve loved 
Shakespeare, borrowing lines from Macbeth (a First Amendment 
opinion), As You Like It (a FERC opinion), and King John (a tax opinion). 
Beyond literary references, Steve’s opinions reveal his fondness for 
animals. Appearing throughout are dogs, cats, horses, elephants, rats, 
frogs, gorillas, grasshoppers, ants, fleas, and birds of all kinds. The pushmi-
pullyu, a two-headed antelope, shows up twice, first in an antitrust opinion 
and later in a RICO opinion. The pushmi-pullyu highlights still another 
lovely feature of Williams opinions: references so obscure that only with 
Google and Wikipedia can one easily discover their meanings. In a criminal 
contempt proceeding, Steve wrote of a party’s Derrida-like efforts, 
referring to the French postmodern deconstructionist philosopher. In an 
opinion reviewing an FCC decision, Steve harkened back to a bill of 
attainder against the Earl of Kildare during the reign of Henry VIII. And 
thanks to Judge Williams, it is circuit law that “[a] federal receivership is 
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not Schroedinger’s cat,” a reference to the early twentieth-century 
quantum physicist. (To discover how quantum physics and the Professor’s 
poor cat could possibly relate to federal receiverships, see Auction Co. of 
America v. FDIC, 141 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1998).) 
Steve had a special way of getting straight to the heart of every issue. 
“This case,” he wrote in one of his last dissents, “is a story of how creative 
lawyering can unseat settled, useful understandings, not how a court came 
to properly understand the true intent of Congress.” My favorite is Steve’s 
opinion in Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff’d, 506 
U.S. 224 (1993). Dismissing a claim against the U.S. Senate, he wrote: “If 
the Senate should ever be ready to abdicate its responsibilities to 
schoolchildren, or, moved by Caligula’s appointment of his horse as 
senator, to an elephant from the National Zoo, the republic will have sunk 
to depths from which no court could rescue it.” 
Writing graceful, well-reasoned opinions didn’t keep Steve busy 
enough. He regularly published scholarly articles on a vast range of issues, 
including natural gas regulation, interstate trade, water resources, 
environmental risk, healthcare regulation, unconstitutional conditions, 
takings, public choice theory, due process—the list goes on and on. And if 
that weren’t enough, Steve learned Russian and wrote two books about 
reformers in the late Russian Empire. In one, Liberal Reform in an 
Illiberal Regime, he explores the agrarian reform efforts of Piotr Stolypin, 
Tsar Nicholas II’s last prime minister. Steve uses Stolypin’s initiatives to 
consider whether reforms voluntarily undertaken by an autocracy can spur 
the development of liberal democracy. I won’t mislead you—this book isn’t 
Crime and Punishment—but it’s very interesting and very, very Steve 
Williams. Who else could have written this sentence: “The process can start 
with a small group, such as the barons who wrung promises from King John 
at Runnymede, gradually sweeping in greater portions of society as deals 
followed between parliament and king in the Hundred Years War and the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688”? Steve viewed radical land reform as the 
most promising path to freedom for tens of millions of Russian peasants, 
or as he wrote, “a new Russian farmer, free from artificial constraints, self-
confident, risk-taking, and independent.” The book displays Steve’s 
unbounded intellectual curiosity, as well as his abiding faith in both human 
freedom and the ability of individuals to make wise decisions for 
themselves. It was this very same passion for individual freedom that 
anchored his opinions about free speech, the rights of criminal defendants, 
and what he viewed as excessive government regulation. 
After years of reading Steve’s opinions and many of his articles, and 
discussing with him not just law but also politics, foreign policy, history, 





The fundamental fact about the Greek was that he had to use his mind. The 
ancient priests had said, “Thus far and no farther. We set the limits of 
thought.” The Greeks said, “All things are to be examined and called into 
question. There are no limits set to thought.” 
 
Like the Greeks he was so fond of quoting, Steve Williams recognized no 
limits on thought. For Steve, all things were to be examined and called into 
question. 
In recent years, we have been inundated with articles, speeches, and 
columns about judicial activism and the role of ideology in the courts. Steve 
Williams certainly had an ideology, just not the one commentators worry 
about. He believed that the legitimacy of judicial decisions flows from their 
faithfulness to constitutional and statutory text, their respect for precedent, 
and the clarity and coherence of their reasoning. It is this ideology that 
undergirds all of Judge Williams’s opinions, enriching both the work of this 
court and the development of the law. 
The D.C. Circuit—indeed the entire federal judiciary—is just not the 
same without Steve Williams. 
